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Abstract 
From an experiential point of view, acceleration is a space-shrinking and a time-stressing 
phenomenon. Assuming that this phenomenon has reached a decisive pervasiveness in late 
modernity, so that it has become determinative of social relations in general, a question about its 
impact on the structure of experience and of the subject of experience bears a double signification: 
on the one hand, it concerns temporality, i.e., the structure of the experience of time, and, on the 
other hand, it concerns historicity, that is, the structure of the experience of historical time. I suppose 
that the development of this question requires examining the structure of the experience of the 
present, given that acceleration may be considered at first sight as an intensive experience of the 
present. But, then, an examination of the structure of the experience of the present is deeply rooted 
in the structure of the present itself. So, my argument relates three concepts: experience, present, 
and acceleration, the latter according to the double effect in which this phenomenon appears (space-
shrinking and time-stressing). 
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From an experiential point of view, acceleration is a space-shrinking and a time-stressing 
phenomenon. Assuming that this phenomenon has reached a decisive pervasiveness in late 
modernity, so that it has become determinative of social relations in general, a question 
about its impact on the structure of experience and of the subject of experience bears a 
double signification: on the one hand, it concerns temporality, i.e., the structure of the 
experience of time, and, on the other hand, it concerns historicity, that is, the structure of 
the experience of historical time. I suppose that the development of this question requires 
examining the structure of the experience of the present, given that acceleration may be 
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considered at first sight as an intensive experience of the present. But, then, an examination 
of the structure of the experience of the present is deeply rooted in the structure of the 
present itself. So, my argument relates three concepts: experience, present, and acceleration, 
the latter according to the double effect in which this phenomenon appears (space-shrinking 
and time-stressing). 
Regarding this threefold relation, a relevant issue concerns the tolerance threshold of the 
subject of experience with respect to acceleration. You may recall some old—and in some 
cases not so old—sci fi movies in which the performers had to make a variety of extreme 
gestures in order to suggest the impact that an accelerating spaceship exerts on their bodies: 
let us take this sort of bizarre pantomime as a hint pointing to that threshold. It could be 
argued—hypothetically—that the experience of acceleration strains the subject of 
experience to the point where experience founders in its sheer condition of possibility, 
meaning that there is a limit beyond which acceleration cannot be experienced as such, 
but—provided that the creature stands the test—only suffered as a kind of dull, continuous 
noise or, if you wish, as something of a still stand, a continuity of the same. 
Here the threshold, the limit is the thing that matters. If the experience of acceleration at its 
highest intensity limits with the very condition of possibility of experience, what could this 
condition be? To begin with, one cannot experience the condition of possibility of 
experience. This condition is the blind spot of experience, which is active in it, but never 
appropriable for experience at the moment of its presence—of its present. This condition, 
then, is a certain lapse, a leap, an interval, a lacuna that opens in the present of experience. 
You never experience the present of your experience. In this primary sense, experience is 
always a posteriori, nachträglich, après-coup. The present of experience is something of a 
blow, a stroke: you don’t feel the blow instantly; at the moment it hits, it has an anesthetic 
effect. According to this, the present of experience is necessarily disrupted in itself, and its 
structure is unavoidably determined by an intrinsic deferral. Without this structural deferral 
there would be neither past nor future, neither memory nor perception, neither thinking nor 
even the possibility of language; there wouldn’t be the possibility of relating to oneself nor 
of opening oneself to otherness—there would be no possibility at all. 
It could be argued, perhaps, that the striving for ever increasing acceleration—as seen from 
the point of view of the subject—seeks anxiously precisely this: to remove any deferral, to 
make experience coincide with its condition, to bring it to a pure and simple present, which 
would mean the standstill of experience. Yet it may be a desperate search. 
In his Preface to the Genealogy of Morality Nietzsche states that we, humans, like busy 
laborious bees, are occupied only in bringing something home, with neither heart nor ears 
for “experiences.” And he continues: “On the contrary, like somebody divinely absent-
minded and sunk in his own thoughts who, the twelve strokes of midday having just boomed 
into his ears, wakes with a start and wonders ‘What hour struck?’, sometimes we, too, 
afterwards rub our ears and ask, astonished, taken aback, ‘What did we actually experience 
then?’” (Nietzsche 2006, 3) 
I return now to the question of acceleration. I am inclined to believe that it is not possible 
to speak of acceleration as a fundamental and determining vector of the modern (and 
certainly late modern) individual and social life without bringing complexity into view. In 
this sense, the essential character of modernity and of its present developments may be 
envisaged as a constant interplay between acceleration and complexity. Of course, this is 
nothing new. But the way to tackle the one or the other, or both concepts at a time is diverse 
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beyond nuances. I confess that I am old-fashioned: although much has been thought and 
said about this issue during the last century, my understanding of these two concepts owes 
much to Hölderlin and Hegel, or, more generally, to the consideration of the critical changes 
that occurred in the transition from the 18th to the 19th century1. Both, Hölderlin and Hegel 
had, perhaps, a most penetrating insight into the historical tendencies harbored by the forces 
to which both concepts and their interplay refer. 
In the following I will address the question of acceleration keeping in mind its interplay 
with complexity. Of course, a proper discussion of both concepts would exceed the limits 
of this communication. I will develop my considerations under diverse headings that I deem 
to be relevant in view of the “times of acceleration” (and the “acceleration of time”) that 
would characterize, precisely, our time. These headings will introduce to vignettes threaded 
by the question: what remains of experience in the “times of acceleration”? And this means: 
what remains of the subject of experience in such “times”? Would it be, if anything, a 
subject? Or should it be someone or something definitively other?  
Dislocation 
At the beginning of his first Bremen lecture of 1949 on Das Ding (The Thing), in a short 
preamble entitled “The Point of Reference,” Martin Heidegger comments on the fact that 
“[a]ll distances in time and space are shrinking.” (Heidegger 2012, 3) A vertiginous 
transformation of the relation of human beings to time and space is in course, and this 
transformation is essentially attributable to the multiple technological advances: radio, 
airplanes, film, recording apparatuses, television. However, this shrinking, “this hasty 
setting aside of all distances brings no nearness,” (ibid.) sentences Heidegger. He is 
implying that nearness is not something that you could properly measure by meter units, or 
by inches or yards. Nearness is not touched by this abolition of distances. It “remains 
outstanding,” so that “[e]verything washes together into the uniformly distanceless.” 
(Heidegger 2012, 4) This pervading condition would be “more uncanny,” argues Heidegger, 
than the bursting into pieces of everything that a nuclear war could bring about. In fact, the 
horrible, the atrocious (das Entsetzliche), the uprooting of everything that is has already 
occurred. Here are the closing remarks of the preamble: 
 
The horrifying is what transposes [heraussetzt] all that is out of its previous essence. What is so 
horrifying? It reveals and conceals itself in the way that everything presences, namely that despite 
all overcoming of distance, the nearness of that which is remains outstanding. (Heidegger 2012, 
4) 
 
The expression das Entsetzliche is translated here as “the horrifying.” That is correct, but 
the noun means also displacement, dislocation, an abrupt removal (Heraussetzung) of 
something from its usual or proper site, and in this case, according to what Heidegger says, 
radically of everything, a removal that forecloses the access to the thing, not of course to 
the Kantian “thing in itself”, because this is part of the closure: the removal under 
 
1  Under the metaphor of “saddle period,” Reinhart Koselleck conceived the times between 1750 
and 1850 (or 1770 and 1830) as the transition from the “Modern Times” (Neuzeit) to Modernity 
(Moderne); from a different perspective, Foucault viewed the same period as the “birth of 
biopolitics” and with it, as the beginning of the new form of power essentially associated with 
liberalism. 
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consideration forecloses the access to the thing as thing. In this sense, it is properly uncanny, 
unheimlich: and there is a close proximity between the “horrifying” and the uncanny. With 
these implications, the preamble gives way to the lecture. And it is particularly interesting 
that, however emphatic the use of the word das Entsetzliche is here, there is no trace of it in 
the following disquisition about “the thing,” unless we take the disquisition about it as a 
meditation on the “nearness” that remains outstanding (ent-setzt) as a result of the 
technological shaping of experience in the modern world. Anyway, it could be said that the 
word (das Entsetzliche, die Entsetzung) would be, in Heidegger’s view, the proper name of 
what is at the same time the essence and the effect of the shrinking of all distances, let us 
say, of acceleration2. In this sense, it is a concept that deserves further interrogation under 
the characteristic of the aforesaid structural disruption of the present. 
History 
In terms of historical experience, it is perhaps the French Revolution that constitutes the 
decisive stage for the emergence of an explicit sense of acceleration. For good reasons, of 
course, since the French Revolution could not but be felt as an unprecedented acceleration 
of historical time. Events evolved one after another at a breathtaking pace, putting to the 
test the capacity of everyone’s comprehension, including those who deemed themselves as 
the ones steering the whole process. But in fact, as seen from a broader point of view, this 
acute sense of acceleration of history epitomized a host of feelings and sensations 
experienced and of efforts done in order to keep up with multiple and disturbing changes 
occurring for more than a century in all fields of social and individual life. 
This “keeping up” indicates that it became more and more difficult for the subject to relate 
to her own experience in a manner that could preserve untouched the innermost 
characteristics of a stable identity: the pace of changes began to be glaringly faster than the 
subject’s ability to adapt to it, not to say to gain thorough control of it. In a certain way, 
Romanticism was the most acute response to this challenge. The dialectics of self-
annihilation and self-creation (the supremely smart ruse of Romantic irony, as Schlegel, for 
 
2 In order to learn something about this Entsetzlichkeit of time and space shrinking in connection 
with speed and acceleration, we should consult Heidegger’s Beiträge zur Philosophie 
(Contributions to Philosophy) from 1936-1938, known as Vom Ereignis (Of the Event or From 
Enownment). In § 56 “The Lingering of the Abandonment of Being in the Concealed Manner of 
Forgottenness of Being”, point 15, he affirms: “the abandonment of being (is] brought nearer by 
being mindful of the darkening of the world and the destruction of the earth in the sense of 
acceleration, calculation, the claim of massiveness.” (Heidegger 2000, 83) These three aspects are 
three concealments of the abandonment of Being, of which Heidegger offers a nearer approach in 
§ 58. Concerning acceleration he says: “Acceleration — of any kind; the mechanical increase of 
technical ‘speeds,’ and these only a consequence of this acceleration, which means not-being-able-
to-bear the stillness of hidden growth and awaiting; the mania for what is surprising, for what 
immediately sweeps (us) away and impresses (us), again and again and in different ways; 
fleetingness as the basic law of ‘constancy.’ It is necessary to forget rapidly and to lose oneself in 
what comes next. From this point of view, then, the false idea of what is high and "highest" in the 
dis-figuring [Mißgestalt] of maximum accomplishment; purely quantitative enhancement, 
blindness to what is truly momentary, which is not fleeting but opens up eternity. But from the 
point of view of acceleration the eternal is the mere lasting of the same, the empty ‘and-so-forth.’ 
The genuine restlessness of the struggle remains hidden. Its place is taken by the restlessness of 
the always inventive operation, which is driven by the anxiety of boredom.” (Heidegger 2000, 
84f.) 
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instance, deployed it) was for a fleeting moment the way to save the ego from its absorption 
in raw and hostile objectivity. 
The Revolution was a kind of Entsetzung, an abrupt displacement, a dislocation of all earthly 
things. Not just a temporal displacement, nor a spatial dislocation, but a spatio-temporal 
disruption, a collapse at once of the place in its present and of the present in its place, which 
in its core maintains a sort of strange imbalance; strange, because it is this very imbalance 
that stabilizes at any moment the driving force of the disruption of historical experience and 
of the subject’s sense of historical time. 
Language 
There were symptoms, symptoms of the most diverse nature and in the most diverse fields. 
Take for instance language. In an article published in the Tatler, 1710, the alleged author of 
an epistle that is reproduced by the alleged Isaac Bickerstaff, Esq., one of the many monikers 
of Jonathan Swift, complaints about “the great Depravity of our Taste; and the Continual 
Corruption of our Style.” The core of the corruption is the extended practice of abbreviating 
words by the elision of vowels, the contraction of consonants, the reduction of two syllables 
to one, and more severe mutilations, which increase the overload of monosyllables, “which 
are the Disgrace of our Language.” (Swift 2014, 98) It is a kind of linguistic entropy, a 
regression that threatens to dissipate the word in the last whisper, at a short distance of the 
most extreme linguistic project at the Academy of Lagado (third voyage of Gulliver’s 
Travels), directed to the total suppression of language in favor of a communication by way 
of things. (Not a proper communication, you would say, but a “commodification.”) It is 
Swift’s critique of the Moderns, as seen from the dominant satirical side of his writing. This 
critique, in what concerns language, has its very center in the repudiation of the capitalistic 
structuration of all social relations in the Kingdom, led by the “moneyed class.” 
In this sense, it seems sound to say that the Swiftian critique, his taking sides with the 
Ancients against the Moderns, inasmuch as it concerns the changes of “the English Tongue,” 
points towards the transition from the countryside to the city. And, of course, the place of 
the moneyed class is the city, not the rural areas. The city narrows the relations between 
human beings. The market, as its fundamental reality, urges, sets them in emergency. The 
linguistic result of such narrowing and urgency is the subordination of language to the same 
principle that governs economy: language must submit to the rules and requirements of 
business, it has to become a language of the market, so that its possible nuances and 
ambiguities do no distract partners from the ends to which it has to ancillary serve. The 
definitive scope of a totally urbanized society would be the erasure of language, for 
economic exchange would be total exchange of meaning, and of one and only one univocal 
meaning: money would replace the word. 
In contradistinction to this, as seen from Swift’s critical point of view, the countryside 
characterizes itself by extension and leisure (leisure as spacing of production and business), 
whose proper expression is the ample phrase, the polysyllabic expansion of words, the 
vocalic opening. And there is more: for precisely this expansion and leisure make possible 
to share the word without the interests of each one being immediately compromised; they 
make conversation possible. 
In the end, the shortening, the mutilation of words, and the promptness and efficiency of 
exchanges is the pressing demand that the determination of social relations by economic 
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interests makes on the forms by which those relations used to be exercised in the common 
space of communication and linguistic exchange. 
Fate 
Let’s linger still a while on language, but this time considering its poetic articulation. The 
one who is perhaps the most conscious of all modern poets, Friedrich Hölderlin, had the 
sharpest sense for the changes that language, that is, human life itself, suffers under the 
prevailing epochal forces, which are, indeed, complex and essentially contrasting. This 
means that, as a modern poet, Hölderlin had the most penetrating perception of the destitute 
condition of the poet and of poetry itself in the context of Modernity. His testimony about 
this condition anticipated Hegel’s sentence according to which art has ceased in modern 
times to keep up with the Spirit’s interests and exigencies (I will return to this in a moment), 
though Hölderlin’s essential concern was “to secure for today's poets a bourgeois existence” 
(Hölderlin 1988, 101), in a sort of implicit allusion to Plato’s exclusion of the poets from 
the polis, which—as condemnation of the arts of appearance and deception—would be a 
sign of the philosopher’s commitment to truth. The aforesaid securing of the poets’ 
existence in bourgeois (that is, modern) society depends on a consideration of the condition 
that made poetry (Dichtung) originally possible precisely as a primordial mode of truth in 
the Greek world. In this sense, what is needed is to take “into account the difference of times 
and institutions [in order to] elevate poetry today to the mechane of the ancients.” (Hölderlin 
ibid.) This mechane, this eminent technique consists in a “lawful calculation,” in the “law 
of calculus.” The essential problem of modern—or, in Hölderlin’s terms, Hesperian—
poetry is that its prosody is unstable, that it lacks the “law of calculus.” The “lawful 
calculation,” which was the admirable feat of the Greeks, is not at hand for the modern poet, 
and even if a certain technique were at her disposal there is no guarantee that it could 
consistently accomplish the task of calculation, which has to do with what is in itself 
incalculable, “the living meaning,” existence itself. The tones, which are forms of life—
tragic, epic, and lyric—, are accelerating. This imposes a poetological reflection that has in 
its core the question of measure (Maas) and the poetic knowledge that “[e]ach one, 
nonetheless, has its measure,”3 (Hölderlin 1990, 227) that is, that each one blossoms in the 
language of its own, which is the task of the poem to greet and to harbor. This knowledge 
has the character of memory, a remembrance (Andenken) that re-members each one to itself, 
inasmuch as each one owes herself to each other. 
Complexity 
Hegel was the thinker of complexity in many ways and of course the Hegelian dialectics is 
the overarching systematic operation that deals with complexity in all of its dimensions and 
manifestations. For the present purpose, I am particularly interested in one of the many 
relationships in which these dimensions and manifestations make their power felt. It is 
precisely what characterizes the modern world in a certain sense by contrast: I mean, the 
end of great art, that is, of the power of art to respond to the highest interests of the spirit. 
This power consists in the capacity of bringing worldly relations, circumstances, events, and 
behaviors to a higher, purer, truer level by the work and effect of fantasy: of imaginal 
representation. For Hegel, the point is that this capacity is no longer able to undertake the 
 
3  “Nur hat ein jeder sein Maas.” I have slightly changed Christopher Middleton’s translation of this 
verse of Der Rhein (The Rhine): he has “Each man, nonetheless, has its measure.” 
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elaboration and clarification of those relations in correspondence to the challenge that they 
pose to the spirit in present times. Such relations have become complex, specified and 
stratified in multiple ways. So, the spirit has to resort to other dispositions of its own, 
definitively abandoning the noble epoch of—allow me to phrase it this way—the imaginary 
management of reality in its actual life and work. By virtue of this abandonment, art is 
consigned to the past of the spirit, no matter if it may improve and refine its performance 
and outputs in the future. The present of a new epoch demands an activity absolutely 
different: sober judgment, penetrating scientific knowledge, the effectiveness of general 
laws, and—in essential terms—the limitless unfolding of a reflection that has to take charge 
of concrete reality in its over-determined diversity and pervade it with its constant operation. 
Nevertheless, a certain complexity escaped Hegel’s indisputable acumen. And it was a 
rather obvious one. It was the new complexity of a new form of life, whose flagrant evidence 
is the hustle and bustle of the modern city. 
There is a letter from Hegel to his wife reporting his first impressions of Paris, which have 
Hegel’s long acquaintance with his beloved Berlin as background. Taking his first 
sightseeing of “this capital of the civilized world,” he evokes the Zelten in Berlin on passing 
in front of some Parisian cafés, but with a proviso that “[they host] ten times as many people 
at the tables … As I go through the streets, the people look just the same as in Berlin, 
everyone dressed the same, about the same faces, the same appearance, yet in a populous 
mass.” (Letter of September 3, 1927, Butler & Seiler 1984: 650) It is true that Paris was still 
at that time a city that displayed abundant remnants of its medieval past, but Hegel’s 
statement betrays a certain blindness of him, not being capable to grasp the difference that 
an incomparably greater number of people may entail in this case. This number, observable 
in the streets and public places, announces the advent of a different type of city, the modern 
city, and with it an essentially different type of subject, which is substantially determined 
by the city itself. The crowded city is also a city where people are caught in the rush of a 




The fundamental experience of the modern city was primarily coined by Charles Baudelaire. 
It is an experience of rapid change and of the weight of memory that counterbalances the 
haste. The Tableaux Parisiens (Parisian Scenes), second part of The Flowers of Evil, and 
The Spleen de Paris bear witness to this experience. But there is perhaps no other place in 
Baudelaire’s oeuvre than a couple of verses of Le Cygne (The Swan), the fourth piece of the 
Scenes, which can give to the sense of change the most compelling expression: 
 
Le vieux Paris n'est plus (la forme d'une ville 
Change plus vite, hélas! que le cœur d'un mortel);  
The old Paris is gone (the form a city takes 
More quickly shifts, alas, than does the mortal heart); 
 
4  In this context, there are few things more telling than the comparison between Hegel’s fresh view 
of the City of Lights and the description of London’s thronged streets and places in Edgar Allan 
Poe’s The Man of the Crowd (Poe 2006, 229ff.). 
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(Baudelaire 1975, 85; Baudelaire 1998, 175) 
 
It is, of course, the transformation of medieval Paris (mainly on the right bank of the Seine, 
where the places to which Baudelaire refers in his poem are) by Baron Georges-Eugène 
Haussmann in the middle of the 19th century. 
There is no possibility for the beats of the heart of a mortal to keep pace with the irresistible 
transformation of Baudelaire’s city. But this heart, wounded by the abolition of so many 
familiar places and scenes (the old “Parisian scenes”), opposes the gravity of its memory: 
 
Paris change! mais rien dans ma mélancolie 
N'a bougé! palais neufs, échafaudages, blocs, 
Vieux faubourgs, tout pour moi devient allégorie, 
Et mes chers souvenirs sont plus lourds que des rocs. 
Paris may change, but in my melancholy mood 
Nothing has budged! New palaces, blocks, scaffoldings, 
Old neighbourhoods, are allegorical for me, 
And my dear memories are heavier than stone. 
(Baudelaire 1975, 86; Baudelaire 1998, ibid.) 
 
The Swan is dedicated to Victor Hugo, who at the time was banished and had to remain in 
Guernesey, one of the so-called Anglo-Norman Isles or Channel Isles, according, 
respectively, to the French and the British denomination. It is, perhaps, the greatest poem 
of exile ever written, and in fact it deploys a gallery of unfortunate figures that share this 
melancholy fate: Andromache, the wretched swan longing for its native lake, painfully 
stretching the head towards the sky like Ovid’s man, the consumptive “negresse,” the 
orphans, the sailors “left forgotten in an island,” the “captives, the defeated … many others 
more!” All of these, in a first instance, are called as witnesses to a condition that is entirely 
new, but at the same time awaken things immemorial, which resist this condition by their 
own fragility and their abandonment to the forces that call them back. In this sense, more 
decisively, they are the figures of memory. 
And certainly, it is the radical experience of the emergence of an unfathomable memory as 
a sort of gravitational pull exerted on the subject, not by the past in a merely chronological 
sense, but by her finitude. The specificity of this memory is expressed at the very beginning 
of the poem: “Andromache, I think of you…,” “Andromaque, je pense à vous…” “I think 
of you…” is, of course, “I remember you,” “je me souviens de vous,” but what is decisive 
is to hear this “penser à” (“to think of”) as a modification (a modalization, if I may) of the 
Cartesian “I think,” “je pense,” “ego cogito,” which takes place in a (supposedly) pure 
present. This little “à” is what evinces an undeniable fracture, a hiatus in the present; it is 
the gravitational (weak) force that separates the present from itself, at the same time that it 
makes this present possible (and also its past—and a future beyond conjecture). Any haste, 
no matter how marginal, any acceleration of the pace of life awakens the little “à” and the 
unending memory hidden in it. And the haste itself is nothing but the desperate flight from 
the non-disposable sediments that this memory reminds and brings to the present, as a 
pending present. 
You might call that unapparent force, which disrupts the present from itself, Ent-setzung.  
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Society 
Preceding my vignette on the city, it seems to me that it would have been on the line to have 
“society” in the sequence. It is another guess of mine that this option should have led us to 
discuss things that deserve a more patient attention. However, I cannot leave unsaid 
something that relates to my last notes about the experience of the Baudelerian subject. I 
was referring to the haste that characterizes the modern city: this haste is a flight, I was 
saying, and the flight is the mode and the essence of the accelerated movement of modern 
society. To accelerate is to run away. But in running away there should not remain anything 
of that wherefrom one runs away. The more accelerated the runaway, the more intense the 
momentum of the flight, the more it drags with itself all of those forms and ways, customs 
and relations that were current until they dissipate, under the force of the gale, in the density 
of a new air. This density owes to the many relics that, in a somewhat more ethereal way, 
remain now in the air we breathe and absorb.  
I keep in mind the famous passage of the Communist Manifesto that speaks of the 
restlessness of the bourgeoisie. “Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted 
disturbance of all social conditions, everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the 
bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones.”5 
But I stop here and make haste, for the sake of time. Just one vignette more. 
Wind 
In The Meridian, the discourse of acceptance of the Georg Büchner Prize, pronounced on 
22 October 1960 by Paul Celan, whom it is apt to consider as the greatest poet of the German 
language in the 20th century, one reads a passage that speaks about the poem—the poem that, 
in its turn, speaks on its own behalf, but at the same time and in a certain sense the poem 
that has always hold the hope of speaking “on behalf of a totally other.” (Celan 2011: 8) Yet 
this is not a granted expectation—indeed, a hope is precisely this, a non-granted expectation, 
a hypothesis; it is a thought, a thought of the heart, a thought that opens towards what 
thought cannot preconceive, a possible thought that frailly rests on its own possibility, which 
would be the present condition of the poem. Here is the passage: 
 
The poem tarries and tests the wind—a word related to the creaturely—through such thoughts. 
Nobody can tell how long the breath pause—the testing and the thought—will last. The “swift,” 
which has always been “outside,” has gained speed; the poem knows this, but heads straight for 
that “other,” that it considers reachable, able to be set free, perhaps vacant, and thus turned—
let’s say: like Lucile—turned toward it, the poem. (ibid.) 
 
5 The entire passage, namelessly quoted, is the following: “The bourgeoisie cannot exist without 
constantly revolutionizing the instruments of production, and thereby the relations of production, 
and with them the whole relations of society. Conservation of the old modes of production in 
unaltered form, was, on the contrary, the first condition of existence for all earlier industrial 
classes. Constant revolutionizing of production, uninterrupted disturbance of all social conditions, 
everlasting uncertainty and agitation distinguish the bourgeois epoch from all earlier ones. All 
fixed, fast-frozen relations, with their “train of ancient and venerable prejudices and opinions, are 
swept away, all new-formed ones become antiquated before they can ossify. All that is solid melts 
into air, all that is holy is profaned, and man is at last compelled to face with sober senses, his real 
conditions of life, and his relations with his kind.” (Marx/Engels 2016, 36f.) 
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The word “swift” translates das Geschwinde, the fast, the speedy, that which moves and 
pushes in a rush. There is no explanation of what is that to which this “swift” refers, but it 
seems clear that it alludes to an all-embracing phenomenon—a global phenomenon, if you 
wish. Celan is evoking a passage from Woyzeck, the marvelous play by Büchner. In the 
passage, the Captain asks Woyzeck about the weather. Woyzeck answers: “Bad, Herr 
Hauptmann, bad. Wind.” And the Captain adds: “I can feel it already, there’s something of 
a speed (s’ist so was Geschwindes) out there; a wind like that has an effect on me like a 
mouse.” (Büchner 2013, 240) You could say, in German, der geschwinde Wind, “the swift 
wind,” the wind of swiftness, the wind that swiftness is. In fact, it could be said, it is the 
wind that nowadays blows everywhere, perhaps the Benjaminian wind that blows from 
Paradise, which prevents the Angel of History from making a halt and mending all things 
broken, perhaps it is the wind that the creature, the most vulnerable of all things tests, 
bearing in its tremulous scenting testimony to its own fragility6. This wind, this swiftness, 
blows now and hurries everywhere, provided that everywhere is always “outside,” “out 
there.”  
Duplicity 
Celan, with whom the modern poetic insight firstly deployed by Hölderlin may have come 
to its consummation, due to overwhelming personal and historical experiences, was the poet 
of a double Geschwindigkeit, of a double uncanniness, of a double Unheimlichkeit. This 
double uncanniness, if we follow Celan’s argument in The Meridian, is the one that 
separates and at the same time tends to confuse art and poetry, that is, technology and the 
poem, for art, techne, is the secret force that drives Western history, global history today, in 
an ever more rapid pace. Despite the seeming close proximity between this consideration 
and Heidegger’s stance as I tried to sketch it earlier, a crucial difference subsists, since 
Heidegger wants to maintain ultimately separated art and technology. For Celan there is a 
strangeness that art relentlessly fosters, bringing everything under its mastery. In the end, 
the Holocaust cannot be neatly separated from the “sacred German art,” as Celan’s early 
poem, Death Fugue, implies. There is this strangeness, then, but there is still another 
strangeness to which the poem opens itself: and this one is the improbable advent of a further 
other that resists any compulsory assimilation7. Correspondingly, a double acceleration 
prevails: the forcefully one that doesn’t spare anything nor anyone who cannot keep its pace, 
searching to coincide absolutely with its present, and the one that the poem exerts “at times,” 
as Celan says, which are other present times, always.  “La poésie, elle aussi, brûle nos 
étapes,” Celan writes (Celan 2011, 6): “Poetry, too, burns our steps.” Poésie, poetry means 
here existence, an existence that runs towards an encounter, at the same time that it remains 
mindful (eingedenk bleibt) of its dates, i. e., of that which separates one present from 
another. 
In the eye of the storm of unbounded and irrepressible acceleration—and within the abyssal 
place of uncanniness, which is one with deferral—there is the need to discern one wind from 
another, one present from the other. One present is the dull, incessantly varying and 
escalating continuity of the same, the other present is an opening to the improbable and 
 
6 I was referred to this passage by Esther Cameron’s study on The Meridian (Cameron 2014, 305). 
7  “[…] perhaps it will succeed here to differentiate between strange and strange (zwischen Fremd 
und Fremd zu unterscheiden) […] — perhaps here a further Other is set free” (Celan 2011, 7). 
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unforeseeable advent of a further other, another experience, the experience of another that, 
just by its possible and impossible imminence, by its coming, brings disruption and with it 
the present of another present, a present to come. This other experience is the work of 
memory; it is its work in Hölderlin’s, Baudelaire’s, and Celan’s certainly different, but 
mutually reverberating senses: Andenken, penser à, eingedenk bleiben. 
Coda 
At the beginning of this essay I posed a question that was to be tested along the series of 
vignettes that I deemed suitable for the task of addressing the condition of our present “times 
of acceleration.” The question concerned experience in the first place, asking what on the 
whole could be experience (or what could be left of experience) in such “times.” This 
question necessarily involves another one, which concerns the subject of experience, 
particularly if acceleration affects the possibility of experience as such. Granted that 
experience needs time, which is time of attention, time of recall, and time of anticipation as 
well, then acceleration, as a formidable time-stressing phenomenon, would tend at once to 
erode experience’s nourishing base and to put the subject of attention, recall, and openness 
towards what is to come in an unbearable situation, if not simply to abolish it. If acceleration 
defies the sheer possibility of having experiences, it calls into question the capacity of 
referring what happens and what happens to me to this very “me.” You have to adapt 
yourself to the vertiginous changes that acceleration brings about, and in adapting to them 
you have to adapt your self to this vertigo. What is left of this “self” is problematic. 
It seems to be generally agreed upon, I think, that the way according to which one constitutes 
oneself as a subject of experience depends on, or at least is fundamentally connected with, 
the capacity to tell, to narrate the experiences one has been through. A further question is if 
this capacity does not restrict itself to the subject’s constitution, but contributes to the 
structuration of experience as such. If this were the case, narration would not be something 
of an aftermath with regard to the actuality and density of experience. There would be, 
indeed, a cardinal relation between experience and narration, and that means, between 
experience and language. Following this line of thought, it could be said that experience’s 
structure is originally linguistic. Of course, this assertion does not imply that you can 
exhaustively tell your experiences: such achievement is utterly impossible, not just because 
of the swarm of unnoticed minutiae of every event, but also because of the remnants that 
still throb in it, and of the multiple divergent directions it may take. Anyway, I am inclined 
to state that language is responsible for the fabric of experience. The linguistic character of 
experience evinces as soon as you realize that experience itself exists, i. e. persists, only in 
its aftermath. “We” are never there in the present of our experiences, in the same sense that 
we do not feel the blow in the exact moment in which it strikes us. This amounts to say that 
there is not a present subject of experience, and that there is not a present experience at all, 
supposing that one sticks to a drastic concept of “present,” in terms of what, for instance, 
Aristotle calls stigme, the “point,” the punctuality of time, now, absolute now, tempus 
instans. Experience belongs to the moment, persists in it; moment is movement, and 
movement, as it moves, is always change, mutation: momen mutatum said Lucretius about 
the atomic swerve, which occurs in a supposedly indivisible point of time, but which bears 
in itself the indelible span and deferral of movement, of change, of time itself. The same 
applies to the subject of experience. The “subject” is a trace, a spectral attribution, some 
sort of equivocal reminiscence by which you ascribe to yourself that what happened and, in 
happening, affected “you”. You tell your experiences, yes, for the want, for the will, for the 
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irresistible drive to telling them, and of telling you, as the one who went through those 
experiences, but in the end you tell them for the sake of what in them is ineffable. This 
ineffability is nothing mystical, it’s just the impossibility of telling or naming the movement 
and the trace at the moment it is changing. This ineffability originally springs from the 
linguistic character of experience. And you, me, we, by the drive to narrating our 
experiences, and so being witnesses of them, are witnesses for this character, which is one 
with our own determination. But you are the sole witness of “your” experience, because, as 
you know, “No one / bears witness / for the witness.” 
In this sense, there is something paradoxical about acceleration. The irresistible thrust by 
which it pushes experience to the verge of its very dissipation brings to light in the blink of 
an eye the temporal structure of experience. As far as acceleration tends to suppress the 
inherent condition of experience through its breathtaking time-stressing (and shrinking) 
effect, it also reveals the structural deferral of experience. As it tends, too, to dissolve the 
very possibility of narrating experience, it evinces that experience, because of that deferral, 
is at once the soil and the product of narration. And narration is the work of memory —
memory, I say, though not in the usual sense of a capacity to remember things and events 
past. ‘Memory,’ I would say, as openness towards deferral: memory, as attention, response, 
and promise. This is the seal of Andenken, penser à, and eingedenk bleiben, bearing, each 
one according to its own peculiar mode and idiom, an essential relation to such deferral: to 
experience’s ineffable core. They resist the devastating power of acceleration: as long as it 
is possible. 
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